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MANUAL CONTROL OF HIGH-ALTITUDE APOLLO LAUNCH ABORT 
By Alfred J. Meintel, Jr., Kenneth R. Garren, 
and Norman R. Driscoll 
Langley Research Center 
SUMMARY 
A fixed-base simulation study has been conducted to determine whether a pilot could 
manually orient the Apollo vehicle to the proper reentry attitude following a high-altitude 
(120 000 feet (36 576 m) and above) abort f rom earth launch by using only the "out-the- 
window" visual scene as an attitude reference. 
vehicle control-system failures, and various aerodynamic characteristics caused by dif- 
ferent launch vehicles and abort altitudes were investigated. 
The effects of different visual scenes, 
The results of over a thousand simulation runs show that manual orientation is pos- 
sible but can be critical for  certain abort conditions when control-system failures a r e  
present. 
INTRODUCTION 
The design of any U.S. manned space mission requires that the human occupants be 
able to abort the mission safely at any time events occur which could cause the loss of 
their life. The launch portion of the mission is a critical one for  which this requirement 
exists. The Apollo launch escape system (LES) employs an escape tower attached to the 
manned spacecraft for the purpose of separating it f rom the Saturn launch vehicle in the 
event of a major malfunction. If an abort occurs during launch, the escape-tower rockets 
ignite and separate the spacecraft from the launch vehicle. However, the misalinements 
of the escape rockets cause the spacecraft-escape-tower combination to tumble randomly 
about all three axes after separation. 
After the Apollo spacecraft has reached its maximum altitude and has started entry 
into a more dense atmosphere, it will orient itself into one of two possible aerodynamically 
stable attitudes. A t r im attitude exists when either the apex (small end of the vehicle) o r  
the heat shield (blunt end a€ the vehicle) is pointed forward. The apex-forward t r im atti- 
tude is undesirable because excessive forces  are exerted on the human occupants and the 
deployment of the landing parachute may be hampered. Therefore, a means must be pro- 
vided to stabilize and orient the vehicle in a heat-shield-forward attitude. 
employed for this purpose is dependent upon the vehicle altitude at abort initiation (fig. 1). 
The method 
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Figure 1.- Flight phases for Apollo launch aborts. 
The low-altitude abort (launch pad to 25 000 feet (7620 m)) is fully automatic; the 
escape tower is jettisoned and the landing parachute is employed for  vehicle stabilization. 
In the medium-altitude abort (25 000 to 120 000 feet (7620 to 36 576 m)), which is also 
automatic, the escape tower is retained and aerodynamic lifting surfaces (canard sur -  
faces) at the upper end of the escape tower orient the vehicle into a heat-shield-forward 
attitude. In the high-altitude abort (120 000 feet (36 576 ni) and above) the canard sur- 
faces cannot be used for  orientation because of the low air density at these altitudes. 
Thus, after LES burnout, the crew will iiianually jettison the escape tower and orient the 
vehicle to the desired reentry angle by using the attitude reaction control system (RCS) 
of the spacecraft. 
The control time of 18 to 200 seconds shown in figure 1 is that time available in 
which the RCS of the vehicle can overcome the aerodynamic forces acting on the vehicle. 
This control time var ies  as a function of the altitude and velocity at which the abort was 
initiated. 
A study conducted by North American Aviation, Space and Information Systems 
Division, Downey, California, showed that a pilot could perform the stabilization and ori- 
entation task by using the onboard attitude system of the spacecraft as a reference. How- 
ever, the stable platform, which supplies the attitude information, might be unable to fol- 
low the vehicle rotations during the tumbling portion of the flight. Hence the onboard 
instrument reference would not be available for  the orientation maneuver. If the instru- 
ment system were not functioning, the visual scene (through the spacecraft windows) would 
have to be used as a reference for  determining the vehicle attitude. 
The present report describes the results of a piloted simulation study in which the 
only reliable attitude information available was assumed to be the "out-the-window" visual 
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scene. The study w a s  made to determine the ability of a pilot to orient the vehicle to the 
proper reentry angle (in the time available) by using the exterior visual scene, to develop 
an operational procedure for  this orientation maneuver, and to determine the effect of 
malfunctions in the vehicle control system on the pilot's ability to perform the orientation 
task. 
of most of these a re  contained herein. 
Over a thousand simulation runs were conducted during the study, and the results 
The authors would like to acknowledge Arthur G. Nolting of the Manned Spacecraft 
Center for  his contribution of supplying the background information and aerodynamic data 
used in the study and Lar ry  A. Bailey of North American Aviation, Inc., for his contribu- 
tion of supplying the information on the Apollo vehicle systems used in the study. 
SYMBOLS 
The units used for  the physical quantities defined in this paper a re  given both in the 
U.S. Customary Units and in the International System of Units (SI). 
two systems a r e  given in reference 1. 
Factors relating the 
B angle between top of window and X-axis of vehicle, degrees 
C depression angle of horizon, degrees 
CD aerodynamic drag coefficient 
CL aerodynamic lift coefficient 
Cm aerodynamic pitching-moment coefficient 
E orthogonal-transf ormation matrix 
element of E in ith row and jth column e i j  
F force, pounds (newtons) 
M moment, foot-pounds (meter-newtons) 
h altitude, feet (meters) 
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*SP 
I 
moment of inertia, slug-foot2 (kilogram-meted) 
specific impulse, seconds 
aerodynamic reference length, feet (meters) 
angular velocity about X-axis, radians/second 
angular velocity about Y-axis, radians/second 
dynamic pressure, pounds/f oot2 (newtons/meter2) 
angular velocity about Z-axis, radians/second 
aerodynamic reference area, f eet2 (meters21 
distance along visual a r c  about local vertical, feet (meters) 
time, seconds 
relative velocity (tangential orbital), feet/second (meters/second) 
weight of fuel, pounds (newtons) 
Cart  e sian coordinates 
angle of attack, degrees 
sideslip angle, degrees 
relative flight-path angle, degrees 
pitch angle, degrees 
roll angle, degrees 
yaw angle, degrees 
angle about the local vertical, radians 
. . . . . __ .. . 
W 
Subscripts: 
A 
B 
cg 
i 
0 
RCS 
t 
angular rate of visual-scene movement about the local vertical, 
degrees/second 
aerodynamic 
body axis 
center of gravity 
inertial axis 
point of origin of body coordinate system 
reaction control system 
total 
component fo r  X-, Y-, o r  Z-axis 
A dot over a symbol r e fe r s  to the first derivative with respect to time. An arrow- 
head denotes positive direction. 
EQUIPMENT 
The equipment setup used in the study is shown in figure 2. The simulation pro- 
gram w a s  conducted in a 53-foot-diameter (16-m) truncated sphere the interior of which 
was coated with a diffuse white paint. The white surface acted as a screen on which the 
visual scenes used in the study were projected. 
f rom a fixed-base Apollo command module mockup located near the center of the sphere. 
The scene w a s  projected from a point-source light type of projector attached to the inner 
axis of a three-axis attitude drive system. The pilot controlled the position of the drive 
system by using a three-axis sidearm controller through an analog computer. 
The pilot viewed the projected scene 
5 
Figure 2.- Simulation facility. 
ATTITUDE CONTROL 
A schematic drawing of the roll-axis control system is shown in figure 3. Two 
different spacecraft attitude-control modes were simulated in the study: the stabilization- 
and-control-system (SCS) entry mode and the monitor mode. Selection of the control 
mode for  all three axes was made by the pilot with a switch (switch 1 in fig. 3) on the 
in st rument panel. 
The simulated SCS entry mode w a s  a proportional-rate-command system with rate 
and attitude feedback. The controller had three levels of output. When the controller 
w a s  deflected out of detent, a signal w a s  used to reset  the attitude-error integrators to 
zero and hold them at that level until the controller w a s  returned to detent. The attitude 
dead band w a s  So about the spacecraft attitude when the controller was released. Fur- 
ther deflection of the controller gave an output signal proportional to deflection. This 
output signal w a s  compared with the rate  feedback and the je ts  were actuated; the 
spacecraft was thus moved until the feedback rate was equal to the commanded rate within 
the dead band of 9 0  per  second. Maximum deflection of the controller actuated switches 
which controlled the je ts  directly. The maximum command ra tes  when the controller 
was deflected to a point just before contact with the direct-command switch were 1 7 O  per 
second in roll and 5 O  per second in pitch and yaw. 
The monitor mode was also a proportional-rate-command system with rate feed- 
back. This mode provided no attitude hold. The rate  dead band in this mode was  
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&0.2O per  second and the maximum command rates  were 0.5O per second in all axes. 
This mode also allowed direct  control of the spacecraft jets by maximum controller 
deflection. 
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Figure 3.- Schematic drawing of control system for roll axis. 
Six additional switches were located on the panel. Three of these switches (one for  
Actua- each axis) were used to disable the rate and attitude feedback (switch 3 in fig. 3). 
tion of this switch to the disable position (open) meant that maximum deflection of the 
controller w a s  necessary to control spacecraft motions in the disabled axis. The 
remaining three switches selected primary or  backup rate  feedback for  each axis 
(switch 2 in fig. 3). 
simulated in the primary rate  feedback system. 
These switches were used to select backup rate when a failure was 
The rate information was displayed to the pilot on a three-axis rate instrument on 
the panel. The maximum rate scaling was 20° per second in each axis. The rate instru- 
ment and switches a r e  shown in figure 4. 
VISUAL DISPLAY 
The Apollo command module mockup used in the simulation provided the proper 
configuration and location of the command pilot's docking window and the left-hand side 
7 
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Figure 4.- Cockpit instrument display. 
Figure 5.- Projection transparency of clear view of Florida. L-65-208 
Figure 6.- Projection transparency of 90-percent-cloud-cover scene. L-66-1103 
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window. An Apollo-type couch was positioned so that the pilot eye position with respect 
to the windows was as it would be on the actual vehicle. The mockup also contained the 
hand controller, the rate instrument, and the switches discussed previously. 
The only attitude reference used in the study w a s  the out-the-window view. Three 
different scenes were used: A clear view of Florida with scattered clouds over the 
water (fig. 5); a 90-percent-cloud-cover scene with no recognizable landmark visible 
(fig. 6); and a 90-percent-cloud-cover scene in conjunction with a simulated rocket pay- 
L-66-1133 
kigure 7.- Projection transparency of 90-percent-cover scene 
with simulated vapor trail.  
load vapor trail (fig. 7). These scenes 
were projected over a 166.5O area by a 
point-source light projection system. An 
angle of 166.5O was required to present the 
entire view from horizon to  horizon as 
seen from 167 000 feet (50 902 m). This 
altitude of the visual projection remained 
constant in all the simulations. 
The projector for  the land scenes 
consisted of the point-source light, a 
20-inch-wide (0.51-m) transparency, and a 
servosystem to position the transparency. 
The point source, which was designed par- 
ticularly for  the simulation, was  a 100-watt 
mercury a r c  lamp with its two ends bent 
into a V-shape (included angle of 120O). 
The lamp therefore gave a full hemispher- 
ical coverage of light of uniform intensity 
with no shadows. The transparency w a s  
made of 10-mil-thick (0.0003-m) plastic 
sheet on which w a s  painted an artist 's  con- 
ception of Florida. Figures 5 and 6 a r e  
photographs of the actual transparencies 
used. These photographs are presented to show the amount of detail contained, but they 
a r e  not representative of the view which the pilot had in the simulation. The light level 
of the simulated scene was one-thousandth of the actual brightness level. 
because of the excellence of the artist's conception, the resulting color contrast obtained, 
and the fact that projection was accomplished with a point source over a large angle (so 
that proper perspective was obtained), the view presented was very realistic in the pilot's 
opinion. 
However, 
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The projection of a 150-watt-filament lamp through a narrow slit simulated the 
payload vapor trail (fig. 7). The slit was covered with a Wratten No. 30 gelatin fi l ter  
(orange-red) to simulate the release of sodium from the payload of a solid propellant 
rocket such as a Nike-Cajun. The sodium vapor trail subtended a 10 angle in width and 
a 38O angle in height. 
The transparencies were positioned with respect to the point-source light by a 
position servosystem. The servosystem positioned the transparency so  that the angular 
rate presented to the pilot was comparable to the rate at which the earth would appear to 
move in actual flight. 
The projection box was mounted on the inner axis of the three-axis drive system. 
In the abort study, unlimited motion in all three axes was required. This freedom was 
accomplished by having no mechanical stops on the equipment and by operating the sys- 
tem with direct-coupled synchrodrives. The synchrodrives which positioned the attitude 
system were mounted on the front of the computer resolvers, and the shaft of the resolver 
was coupled to the shaft of the synchrodrive. The resolvers in the computer were oper- 
ated in the "polar" computing mode, which allowed unlimited rotation in each axis. The 
equations used to compute the attitude are given in the appendix. 
Simulation Procedure 
The Apollo abort program w a s  primarily a three-degrees-of -freedom simulation 
in which only angular ra tes  and positions were involved. The aerodynamic rotational 
moments created by four different trajectories were programed into the simulation. 
These trajectories included those for  both the Saturn IB and Saturn V launch vehicles 
with abort initiation at 120 000- and 150 000-foot (36 576- and 45 720-m) altitudes. 
nonlinear aerodynamic parameters, shown in figure 8, were programed on diode function 
generators as a function of time from abort initiation. Shown in the figure a r e  plots for  
the dynamic pressure s, the vehicle flight-path angle y, and the angular rate of motion 
of the visual scene w as viewed from an orbiting vehicle along the local vertical. The 
integral of the rate w was used to  position the transparency with respect to the point- 
source light. 
The 
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Figure 8.- Aerodynamic parameters programed as a function of time, 
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The nonlinear aerodynamic coefficients CD, CL, and Cm were programed on 
diode function generators as a function of the angle of attack a! of the spacecraft. The 
distribution of these coefficients w a s  assumed to be symmetrical about the zero attitude 
position. Inasmuch as the center of gravity (c.g.) of the actual vehicle does not coincide 
with the centroid, the center-of-gravity offsets were programed in the equations of the 
appendix as constants. The resultant nondimensional moment coefficients as a function 
of the vehicle angles of attack and sideslip a r e  given in figure 9. 
Angle of attack, a, deg 
I I I , , I , I ,  I I I I I I I I I  
-180 - IW -140 -120 -IW -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 W 80 IW 120 140 160 I80 
Sideslip angle, p, deg 
Figure 9.- Moment coefficients plotted as a function of vehicle angles of attack and sideslip. 
The moment coefficient as a function of sideslip angle is plotted with the angles of 
attack and roll equal to zero; the moment coefficient as a function of angle of attack is 
plotted with the angles of yaw and roll equal to zero. The two stable and the two unstable 
t r im attitudes of the vehicle are indicated. 
The assumptions for  the study were: (1) That the abort occurred and followed one 
of the four trajectories programed; (2) that the initial rotational ra tes  during the tumbling 
phase of flight were looo per second about each axis; (3) that the onboard attitude refer- 
ence system gave unreliable information; and (4) that spacecraft rotational-rate informa- 
tion was presented on the cockpit instrument panel and also was available for  use in the 
automatic-control-system feedback. Both single and dual RCS operation were used. In 
addition, various control-system failures w e r e  investigated. The pilot had a choice of 
the control system which would be used - either the monitor or the SCS entry mode. 
It was further assumed that for  all but one type of control-system failure, the tum- 
ble rates would be arrested by the automatic control system of the vehicle. Therefore, 
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most of the simulation runs started when the vehicle was at some fixed attitude in space 
and had rotational ra tes  below the dead band of the control system. Table I shows a 
sketch of the vehicle axis system along with a list of the 25 initial conditions of attitude 
used in the study. 
to be zero were those in which control-system failures were investigated, 
The only runs for  which the vehicle tumbling rates were not assumed 
TABLE I.- INITIAL CONDITIONS OF ATTITUDE USED IN STUDY 
Case 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17  
18  
19 
20 
2 1  
22 
23 
24 
25 
Yaw *, deg 
0 
72 
144 
216 
288 
288 
0 
72 
144 
216 
216 
288 
0 
72 
144 
144 
216 
288 
0 
72 
72 
144 
216 
288 
0 
Roll 
cp, deg 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
72 
72 
72 
72 
72 
144 
144 
144 
144 
144 
216 
216 
216 
216 
216 
288 
288 
288 
288 
288 
Pitch 
8, deg 
100 
172 
244 
316 
28 
100 
172 
244 
316 
28 
100 
172 
244 
316 
28 
100 
172 
244 
316 
28 
100 
172 
24 4 
316 
28 
+ Pitchup 
+ Roll right 
+ Yaw right 
Yaw = Roll = Pitch = Oo 
In addition to the main failure which caused the abort to occur, failures in the 
spacecraft reaction control system were investigated. 
fuel (or jet) system and caused the loss of half the reaction control system. This failure 
was simulated (by the computer operator) by reducing the jet thrust to one-half the nor- 
mal level before the pilot performed a run. The other failures investigated were in the 
feedback of the reaction control system (RCS). Four types of RCS failures were simu- 
lated with the stipulation that not more than one type of failure in only one axis would 
occur during the course of a piloted run. 
spacecraft rate gyros open o r  closed and automatic-control-system switching amplifiers 
One simulated failure was in the 
The four simulated malfunctions included 
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open or closed. 
and the corrective actions required of the pilot. 
Table II gives the characteristics used for  detection of each malfunction 
TABLE II.- FAILURE PROCEDURE 
Component 
Rate gyro 
i 
Rate gyro 
Switching 
amplifier 
Switching 
amplifier 
Failure 
Closed 
Open 
Closed 
Open 
Detection cues 
Continuous acceleration in 
failed axis. Maximum 
deflection of failed-axis 
rate needle indicating 
motion in opposite 
direction to vehicle 
motion. 
Rate needle remains a t  
zero during vehicle 
motion. 
Continuous acceleration in 
failed axis detectable by 
rate-gage and out-the- 
window vision. 
No automatic rate 
damping in failed axis. 
Corrective act ion 
Disable failed axis. Manually 
damp rate in failed axis by 
using out-the-window scene. 
If ra te  needle still indicates 
rate, switch to  backup rate 
gyro in failed axis. Enable 
axis. 
Manually damp rate. Switch 
to backup rate gyro in failed 
axis. 
Disable failed axis. Manually 
damp failed-axis rate. 
Control in direct mode for 
remainder of run. 
Manually damp failed-axis 
rate. Disable failed axis 
and control in direct mode 
for  remainder of run. 
The failures were simulated by the computer operator at various t imes during the 
run. The switching-amplifier-open failure simulation w a s  initiated before the pilot took 
control. This failure caused the vehicle to continue tumbling about the failed axis while 
the automatic system damped the tumbling about the other two vehicle axes. 
failure w a s  simulated by starting the run at  one of the 25 initial attitudes with a residual 
rate of 40° to 60° per second in the failed axis. 
The run procedure w a s  as follows: The initial conditions for the run were set on 
The control mode (either monitor o r  SCS entry 
This type of 
the computer by selecting the trajectory, the starting attitude of the vehicle, and the con- 
trol  system to be used (single or  dual). 
mode) was selected by the pilot before each run. The computer then positioned the equip- 
ment at the proper starting attitude. Upon a signal from the pilot, the computer w a s  put 
into operation and the pilot was given control of the vehicle. During the run, the operator 
would insert a failure in the RCS if one was to be investigated in that run. 
ended either when the pilot had oriented the vehicle to the proper attitude (to his satisfac- 
tion) and given a "hold" signal, or when the vehicle was aerodynamically captured. Aero- 
dynamic capture, as defined in the present study, occurs when the dynamic pressure 
reaches a value above which the vehicle control power cannot pitch the vehicle in a pitchup 
direction from an apex-f orward t r im attitude to a heat-shield-f orward t r im attitude. This 
The run was  
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value of dynamic pressure in the study was 20 lbf/ft2 (958 N/m2) for  dual-control-system 
operation and 10 lbf/ft2 (479 N/m2) for  single-control-system operation. The operator 
then read out the final conditions of the run. The readout consisted of the final attitude 
of vehicle, the time, and the fuel. In order to determine whether the vehicle was in the 
proper capture attitude (if  in doubt), the computer was again put into operation and the 
dynamic pressure was allowed to increase to a value at which the spacecraft jets no 
longer had control. Then a final readout was  obtained to determine whether the heat 
shield or the apex was forward at capture. 
Pilot Procedure 
The orientation of the pilot with respect to the earth during an abort is shown in 
figure 10. The launch is from Cape Kennedy, with an abort occurring at some altitude 
above 120 000 feet (36 576 m). The thrust misalinement of the escape-tower rockets 
cause the spacecraft-tower combination to tumble randomly. The pilot manually jettisons 
the escape tower and the spacecraft remains in the tumbling flight phase. 
back from the onboard rate gyros will stop the tumbling if the system is operating prop- 
erly. At this point the simulation runs a re  begun. 
The rate feed- 
Tumbl i n e  
Figure 10.- Pilot orientation during Apollo launch abort. 
The general procedure used by the pilots for  each run is as follows: 
(1) Check the rate needles and determine whether they are functioning properly 
(failure detection cues given in table II); null any existing rate  in roll or yaw. 
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(2) If a pitch rate exists, allow it to continue until the earth scene appears in the 
window. 
(3) If no pitch rate exists, pitch the vehicle up until scene appears. 
(4) Maneuver the vehicle until proper heading (yaw attitude) is established. (The 
vehicle is at the proper attitude when the heat shield is in the direction of flight and the 
pilot is upside down with respect to the earth and is looking back toward the launch site.) 
(5) Pitch the vehicle until the horizon is at the top of the window with earth above 
and sky below. (The pilot gives a hold signal to  the computer operator at this time.) 
(6) Hold this position until aerodynamic capture when the horizon is forced out of 
the field of view at the top of the window. 
This procedure, which w a s  used for  all the runs performed in the simulation study, 
varied only in the manner in which the heading was determined. The available heading 
reference depended on the visual scene presented to the pilot. Landmarks in the clear 
scene of Florida were used for  heading determination. 
plished when either Cape Kennedy or the Tampa Bay area was used as a yaw reference. 
Both landmarks lay along the initial orbital track of the vehicle. Figure 11 shows the 
pilot's view through the docking window when using the Cape Kennedy area as a heading 
reference. 
Minimum yaw e r r o r  w a s  accom- 
Heading determination when the 90-percent-cloud-cover transparencies were used 
required the pilot to perform a tracking task. The pilot would point the nose of the vehi- 
cle toward the earth so  that he could view a complete broken-cloud-cover scene in his  
docking window. He would observe the motion of the cloud patterns and maneuver the 
vehicle until the direction of motion was parallel to the XZ-reference plane and the cloud 
patterns moved from top to  bottom in the window. The pilot would then pitch the vehicle 
in the direction of the cloud motion (pitch down if the direction of motion was from top to 
bottom of the window) until the horizon was at the top of the window. 
One of the Apollo mission requirements is that launches may be initiated under any 
weather conditions at any time of day. A suggested heading reference for  conditions in 
which landmark recognition and/or tracking is impossible was the use of a payload vapor 
trail. The release of sodium vapor from the payload of a solid-propellant rocket such as 
a Nike-Cajun could produce a vapor trail. The rocket could be launched from the Cape 
Kennedy area at a small  inclination angle to the local vertical or f rom the west coast of 
Florida over the Gulf of Mexico. In the simulation, the vapor trail w a s  assumed to be 
released at an altitude between 80 000 and 100 000 feet (24 384 and 30 480 m) and was 
assumed to continue to  an altitude of 300 000 feet (91 440 m). The sodium vapor can be 
used for  day launches only because this vapor trail requires reflected sunlight for  illumi- 
nation. Trimethyl aluminum, which produces its own illumination from a chemical 
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reaction, can be used in the same launch vehicle fo r  night launches. 
procedure when the vapor trail was used as a reference was to  scan the horizon through 
his docking window until the trail came into view (at which time the proper heading was 
attained). The proper roll  attitude was reached when the horizon was at  the top of the 
window and the vapor trail extended downward. The vapor trail yaw reference offered 
one advantage over the landmarks in that the pilot was positive of his heading when he 
sighted the trail. 
The pilot orientation 1 
Figure 11.- Pilot's view through docking window when using Cape Kennedy area for proper heading reference. L-66-1104 
Another orientation reference used by the pilots w a s  the motion of the horizon in 
the window caused by aerodynamic forces acting on the vehicle. 
w a s  an outgrowth of the results obtained in the tracking maneuvers. 
This orientation method 
Eleven test pilots, including pilots from the Langley Research Center, the Manned 
Spacecraft Center, North American Aviation, Inc., and astronauts from the Manned 
Spacecraft Center participated in the study. Four of these pilots had previous experience 
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in reentry and launch abort simulations (using instrument displays only) and had exten- 
sive experience in RCS failure detection and correction. 
runs employed these four pilots as subjects. All the pilots performed a ser ies  of training 
runs prior to the data runs. 
Most of the failure-simulation 
In one ser ies  of data runs, the pilot wore an unpressurized prototype Gemini pres- 
sure  suit to determine whether the helmet with the visor closed would hinder his vision. 
The data from these runs a r e  included with the results. 
ERROR IN DEFINED PILOT PROCEDURE 
The attitude orientation of the command module is accomplished by the pilot by 
lining up landmarks and the horizon in the docking window. The proper yaw attitude is 
obtained by positioning the landmarks, the vapor trail, or the motion of the cloud pattern 
along a line on the docking window parallel to the XZ-axis. Leveling the horizon in the 
docking window so that it is perpendicular to the XZ-axis produces the proper vehicle 
roll  attitude. The proper pitch attitude, as defined in the study, exists when the horizon 
is at the top of the window. The pitch angle required for a heat-shield-forward t r im is 
dependent on the angle of attack for  t r im  and the flight-path angle of the vehicle. In the 
cases  studied, the pitch-trim attitude required the vehicle to be oriented so that the pilot 
w a s  looking up at the sky (with no natural attitude reference in his window field of view). 
Therefore, when the horizon is positioned at the top of the window, an e r r o r  exists 
between the controlled angle of attack of the spacecraft and the desired angle for  trim. 
Figure 12 shows a diagram of the vehicle orientation if the roll and yaw attitudes of the 
spacecraft a r e  zero. In this figure, 8 is the vehicle pitch attitude with respect to zero; 
B is the angle between the top of the field of view (top of window) and the X-axis of the 
vehicle; C is the depression angle of the horizon, which is a function of vehicle altitude; 
a! is the vehicle angle of attack; and y is the vehicle flight-path angle. 
The depression angle of the horizon C and the vehicle flight-path angle y are 
functions of the vehicle trajectory, and the angle of attack (for zero roll  and yaw) is the 
sum of 8 and y. Therefore, for  the four trajectories studied, the e r r o r  in pitch atti- 
tude caused by using the horizon at the top of the window can be defined at the aerody- 
namic capture point. 
The altitude at which capture occurs var ies  between 150 000 and 200 000 feet 
(45 720 and 60 960 m) fo r  the four  trajectories studied. The depression angle of the hori- 
zon thus var ies  between 7O and 80. 
42O for the window configuration used. Therefore, for  a value of C of 80 and B of 
42O, when the horizon is at the top of the window, the value of 8 is 146O. For the four 
trajectories, the value of y var ies  f rom -5.2O for  the single-control-system Saturn V 
The field of view above the X-axis of the vehicle was 
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120 000-foot-altitude (36 576-m) aborts to -29.6O for  the S-IB dual-control-system 
150 000-foot-altitude (45 720-m) aborts. Therefore, the angle of attack varies from 
151.2O to 175.6O. 
Figure 12.- Angular relations between line of sight, horizon, and vehicle direction of flight. 
When the flight-path angle is between 125O and 210°, the aerodynamic forces which 
act on the vehicle tend to t r im the vehicle toward a heat-shield-forward attitude. Thus, 
the top of the docking window can safely be used as a reference f o r  reentry pitch-angle 
determination. With respect to yaw direction, the capture boundaries a r e  approximately 
*40° about zero. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table ID gives the control time allotted to the pilot for performing the orientation 
maneuver in the simulation and the time which would be available in actual flight for the 
four abort trajectories studied. The actual time is equal to the time from abort initiation 
until the aerodynamic moments acting on the vehicle exceed the spacecraft control power 
minus the time allotted fo r  the automatic control system to damp tumble rates  of looo per 
second about each axis. Spacecraft control power was considered ineffective a t  dynamic- 
pressure values above 20 lbf/ft2 (958 N/m2) for  dual-control system operation and 
10 lbf/ft2 (479 N/m2) for  single-control-system operation. Also shown in the table a r e  
the control time and fuel required to a r r e s t  the tumbling of the spacecraft and the mini- 
mum value of the dynamic pressure during the control phase. 
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TABLE m.- CONTROL TIME AVAILABLE FOR REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM 
CONTROL OF VEHICLE ATTITUDE 
rime required for 
RCS to a r res t  
tumbling rate of Launch vehicle 
Fuel required by Control time Minimum 
RCS to a r res t  available, sec dynamic 
tumbling rates, pressure, 
Saturn V 
Saturn IB 
Saturn V 
Saturn IB 
1000 per sec, 
sec I lbm 1 kg 
Saturn V 
Saturn IB 
Saturn V 
Saturn IB 
Simulation I lbf/ft2 I N/M2 conditions 
Altitude, 
120 000 
120 000 
150 000 
150 000 
36 576 
36 576 
45 720 
45 720 
120 000 
120 000 
150 000 
150 000 
36 576 
36 576 
45 720 
45 720 
~~ 
12.0 
13.0 
13.5 
14.0 
19.5 
18.0 
17.0 
16.0 
7.7 155 140 
7.3 173 158 
The abort trajectories a r e  listed in the order of increasing control time available 
The most severe condition is the Saturn V 120 000-foot-altitude and control authority. 
(36 576-m) abort with single-control-system operation. Although four abort trajectories 
were simulated, most of the data runs were performed by using the 120 000-foot-altitude 
(36 576-m) aborts because the conditions of the aborts at this altitude were more severe 
than those for  the higher altitudes. However, the feasibility of pilot control during the 
lower altitude aborts indicates that pilot control would also be possible during the aborts 
with less  severe conditions. 
Control Systems 
In the early phase of the study, the pilots were requested to perform half the data 
runs with the stabilization-and-control-system (SCS) entry control mode and half with 
the monitor control mode. No appreciable differences between the results for the two 
modes were noted. However, the pilots preferred the tighter ra te  dead band of the moni- 
tor  mode, and this dead band w a s  necessary for ground tracking. 
study, therefore, was conducted by using only the monitor control mode. 
mode had been recommended for  use in the orientation maneuver by previously conducted 
instrument studies, and no problems which would change this recommendation were 
encountered in this visual study. 
The remainder of the 
The monitor 
Test Results 
Clear view of Florida.- The resul ts  of the data runs in which the clear view of 
Florida was used as an attitude reference are given in table IV. The data show that from 
2 1  
90 to 98 percent of the runs were successful when no control-system failures were 
investigated, 
pated in earlier instrument abort studies performed all runs successfully. 
120 000-foot-altitude (36 576-m) aborts with only single-control-system operation were 
not possible because the low control power and the short period of control time available 
made a landmark search impossible. 
The pilots who had more experience with the Apollo vehicle and partici- 
Saturn V 
Number 
of runs 
TABLE W.- TEST RESULTS FOR CLEAR VIEW OF FLORIDA 
Success, 
percent 
= 120  000 f t  (37 576 m] 
9.2 
Launch 
vehicle 
3.4 
Saturn V 
Saturn IB 
Saturn IB 
17.8 
15.0 22.1 
20.0 
7 9  
1 0 7  
1 0 9  98.2 48.3 
~ -. 
~ 
Control 
system 
~ 
Dual 
Single 
Dual 
Single 
8.2 
Saturn V Dual I- Saturn IB Dual 
No failures 
Failures inserted during runs 
Standard 
deviation 
in fuel, 
(4 
104  I 79.8 -1 73.7 I 16.8 I 25.1 I 9.41 10.1 I 3.8 
- -  
Failures inserted prior to runs 
1 3  I 84.6- 1 f33:: 1 i4: I 1 1 1 
82.9 76 1 ._ 
aBlank space indicates that values were not recorded. 
The runs in which control-system failures were simulated showed about 10 percent 
fewer heat-shield-forward captures than those with no simulated failures. All the pilots 
who participated in the study were unable to orient the vehicle into a heat-shield-forward 
attitude in at least one run. 
accomplished if the failure occurred a t  a time when a land view appeared in the pilot's 
window. However, if the failure occurred when only dark sky was visible, proper cor- 
rective action could not be initiated until some scene appeared in the window, and this 
loss of valuable time could have caused unsuccessful completion of the run. 
Failure was detected and corrective action was readily 
There is very little difference between the results for  a failure inserted prior to 
a run and those for  a failure introduced during a run. 
tions were introduced prior to a run; they caused the vehicle to continue tumbling in the 
failed axis after the tumbling in the other two axes had been arrested.  
Switching-amplifier-open malfunc- 
Rate-gyro-open failures inserted prior to a run were not simulated and therefore 
the pilot could always use the rate  instrument to stop the tumbling. Rate-gyro-closed o r  
switching-amplifier-closed failures inserted before the pilot took control were not 
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investigated because this type of failure would have caused extremely high ra tes  which 
the pilot would not have been able to  arrest in the available time period. 
A complete familiarity with Florida landmarks and their locations with respect to 
each other was necessary for  successful alinement of the vehicle when this scene was 
used as a reference. The more useful landmarks were Cape Kennedy, the Tampa Bay 
area, Lake Okeechobee, and the Florida Keys. The visual scene presented was an 
artist's conception, and the entire Florida peninsula was completely clear. Although the 
presented scene was considered very realistic, comparison of the scene with the view 
seen in actual flight could not be made because photographs of Florida from a 
160 000-foot (48 768-m) altitude were not available. 
Ninety-percent-cloud-cover - ~~ scene with vapor trail. - Table V gives the results of 
the simulation runs in which the vapor trail was used as a reference; no landmarks were 
visible for  orientation reference. 
a vapor trail, which extended upward from below the western horizon, in line with the 
spacecraft orbital track. 
zon appeared in the window (if it was not already visible). The vehicle was then posi- 
tioned so  that the horizon was either vertical o r  level in the window. Then a search of 
the horizon was made by yawing (horizon level in window) or  pitching (horizon vertical 
in window) the vehicle until the vapor trail came into view. 
However, a yaw reference was supplied by simulating 
The initial maneuver was to pitch the vehicle up until the hori- 
TABLE V.- TEST RESULTS FOR 90-PERCENT-CLOUD-COVER SCENE WITH VAPOR TRAIL 
[h = 120 000 f t  (36 576 ma 
Launch 
vehicle 
Saturn V 
Saturn IB 
Saturn V 
Saturn IB 
Saturn V 
Saturn IB 
Saturn V 
Saturn IB 
35.9 16.3 1 20.3 1 9.2 1 
No fai lures  inserted 
Dual 52 90.4 56.5 18.1 
18.6 Single 1 57 1 96.5 1 69.9 1 
Dual 50 78.0 66.3 13.2 39.6 18.0 14.9 
Single I 60 1 83.3 I 76.4 1 19.3 I 21.5 1 9.8 9.8 4.4 
Failures inserted during runs 
~~ 
Dual 
Single 
Dual 
Single 
Pressure  suit; no fai lures  inserted 
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This technique had about the same results as those in which the land scene was 
used as a reference. Again, with no control-system failures, certain pilots had all suc- 
cessful data runs. Control-system failures caused about a 12-percent drop in the number 
of successful runs. Investigation of the single-control-system Saturn V 120 000-foot- 
altitude (36 576-m) aborts was not possible because of insufficient time to search the 
horizon. Using the vapor trail as a reference was somewhat more difficult than using 
the land scene because there was only one orientation reference instead of many recogniz- 
able landmarks. However, %he vapor trail offered the advantage that a yaw reference 
was still available after final orientation; no yaw reference was available when the land 
scene was used. The resul ts  of runs performed by one pilot in an unpressurized proto- 
type Gemini pressure suit a r e  shown at the bottom of table V. The resul ts  indicate that 
there is no apparent impairment of vision by the closed-visor pressure-suit helmet. 
Scene with no visible landmarks.- The test  results for  the 90-percent-cloud-cover 
scene with no recognizable landmarks a r e  shown in table VI. Orientation fo r  this case 
involved the establishment of a ground t rack fo r  heading determination by lining up the 
direction of the motion of irregular cloud patterns. This maneuver required that the 
nose of the vehicle be pointed toward the center of the earth so  that the pilot's line of 
vision would be perpendicular to the surface of the earth. At this attitude the highest 
apparent rate of motion for  tracking is obtained. 
tories investigated varied from 0.75O per second to 1.5' per  second. 
The rate of motion for  the four trajec- 
TABLE VI. - TEST RESULTS FOR 90-PERCENT-CLOUD-COVER SCENE 
Launch 
vehicle 
Saturn IB 
Saturn IB 
Saturn V 
Saturn IB 
Saturn V 
Saturn V 
Saturn V 
~ 
Altitude, 
f t  
120 000 
120 000 
150 000 
150 000 
150 000 
120 000 
120 000 
~ 
~ ~~ 
m 
36 576 
36 576 
45 720 
45 720 
45 720 
36 576 
36 576 
Control 
system 
Single 
Dual 
Single 
Single 
Single 
Dual 
Single 
Number 
of runs  
22 
20 
26 
52 
56 
62 
34 
Success, 
per cent 
81.8 
70.0 
76.9 
61.6 
91.1 
96.8 
97.1 
Average 
time, s ec  
80.7 
99.5 
120.2 
147.9 
130.5 
67.2 
65.8 
Standard 
deviation 
in time, sec  
16.7 
6.7 
24.7 
32.3 
16.0 
10.4 
12.9 
Average 
fuel, - 
Ibm 
26.5 
26.6 
40.9 
28.8 
45.8 
22.5 
kg 
12.0 
12.1 
18.5 
13.0 
20.8 
10.2 
Standard 
deviation 
in fuel, 
- 
lbm 
7.1 
8.0 
17.1 
7.0 
13.7 
7.5 
~ 
kg 
3.2 
3.6 
7.8 
11.0 
6.2 
3.4 
Comments 
Track 
Track 
Track 
Track 
r r a c k  and 
ae ro  t r im  
4erO and 
t rack  
4ero and 
t rack  
An initial investigation of this orientation technique was conducted for  the single- 
control-system Saturn IB 120 000-foot-altitude (36 576-m) aborts. Twenty-two runs 
were conducted, and four ended with apex-forward captures. This result indicated that 
insufficient time was available for  tracking accurately enough to assure  heat-shield- 
forward capture. Therefore, three se t s  of data runs were conducted, each successive 
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set  having less severe conditions in order  to allow more time for  tracking. 
continued to be poor. 
the least severe condition, had only 61.6 percent successful runs. Investigation of the 
records and discussion with the pilots indicated that tracking was possible but not 
extremely accurate because of the low rate  of motion of the visual scene and the small  
amount of time available. However, some errat ic  operation of the film drive system was 
encountered. This malfunction could have contributed to the high percentage of unsuc- 
cessful runs. In actual flight a more definite drift indication may be available to the 
pilot. 
The results 
The Saturn IB 150 000-foot-altitude (45 720-m) abort, which w a s  
The highest degree of success was obtained for the single-control-system Saturn IB 
120 000-foot-altitude (36 576-m) aborts; 82 percent of these aborts ended successfully. 
This degree of success is due mainly to the low level of control power, which can be 
explained by the method used for  orientation. The pilot would establish a ground track 
and then pitch the vehicle nose to the horizon in the direction of the track motion. In the 
presence of a high aerodynamic field (lower altitude aborts) and a low level of vehicle 
control power, the aerodynamic forces would tend to t r im the vehicle toward a zero yaw 
attitude. In other words, the aerodynamic forces would tend to  remove the tracking 
e r r o r  (yaw) as the vehicle w a s  pitched. However, in the presence of a low aerodynamic 
field, the vehicle control system would overcome the low aerodynamic forces and there- 
fore the tracking e r ro r  would still exist after the vehicle had been pitched to the final 
attitude. If this e r ro r  w a s  greater than the capture boundary (30° to 400), then when the 
dynamic pressure did reach a level to overcome the control system, the aerodynamic 
forces  would flip the vehicle to an apex-forward capture. The data show that in most 
cases  the pilot tracked the motion correctly but not accurately and thus the vehicle 
flipped to an apex-f orward capture. 
The pilots developed a technique to overcome this yaw e r ro r ,  designated herein as 
"aero trim." The method involved tracking the motion and then pitching to the horizon; 
when the horizon appeared in the window, the pilot would disable the spacecraft yaw and 
roll axes in order that the low-level aerodynamic forces could drive the vehicle in the 
yaw direction. (The roll  axis was disabled to eliminate yaw motions caused by the roll- 
yaw cross-couple effects.) The yaw rate  w a s  allowed to reach about 2 O  per second before 
it was damped. This procedure was repeated until either a reversal  of direction occurred 
(indicating that the t r im point had been passed) or a large angle (300 to 400) was traversed. 
The latter indicated that a large e r r o r  existed in the tracking and the vehicle w a s  moving 
toward an apex-forward capture. If the vehicle had traversed a large angle, the pilot 
would yaw the vehicle in the opposite direction a greater amount than had been traversed 
and again disable the yaw axis to obtain t r im if time permitted. 
formed with only five losses for  the 150 000-foot-altitude (45 720-m) Saturn V aborts. 
Fifty-six runs were per- 
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These results constituted an improvement of about 15 percent over data runs at the same 
conditions when the aero-trim technique was  not used. Although not perfect, these 
results did indicate that a knowledge of the aerodynamic moments acting on the vehicle 
could be a valuable tool in controlling the vehicle. 
The tracking method of heading determination is unattractive both because of the 
difficulty of obtaining an accurate heading and because of the necessity of pointing the 
vehicle toward the earth to accomplish this task. The spacecraft in this position is 
vulnerable in that this vehicle attitude is conducive to apex-forward capture if the 
dynamic pressure buildup should occur before tracking has been completed. 
Sufficient time or control power for  ground tracking was not available for  Saturn V 
These high aero- 
120 000-foot-altitude (36 576-m) aborts. The dynamic pressure remained relatively 
high throughout the runs and had a minimum of 9 lbf/sq f t  (431. N/m2). 
dynamic forces  tended to stabilize the vehicle after tumbling at o r  near one of the two 
stable t r im points. In the majority of the runs, the spacecraft stabilized near the apex- 
iorward t r im point since it was the stronger of the two t r im points. 
gained by using the aero-trim technique for  yaw lineup indicated the possibility of using 
the motion of the vehicle caused by aerodynamic moments to determine the t r im point at 
which the vehicle had been arrested. 
The experience 
The procedure was to pitch the vehicle to  the horizon, if it was not already visible, 
and roll the vehicle (if necessary) so that the ear th  was at the top of the window and the 
sky at the bottom. The roll  and yaw axes were then disabled briefly so that the vehicle 
could seek a yaw trim. The roll and yaw axes were then reenabled and the pitch axis 
was disabled so that the motion of the vehicle with respect to the horizon in the pitch 
direction could be monitored. If the vehicle nose moved away from the horizon (horizon 
moved toward the top of the window), a heat-shield-forward trim was assumed and the 
pitch axis was  reenabled. Motion of the nose toward the horizon indicated an apex- 
forward trim; in this instance an immediate full pitchup maneuver w a s  performed to 
bring the vehicle over to  the opposite horizon near a heat-shield-forward trim. This 
method of control was used to perform data runs for  the Saturn V 120 000-foot-altitude 
(36 576-m) aborts for both single- and dual-control-system operation. For the dual- 
control system, only 2 of 62 runs were unsuccessful, and for  the single-control system, 
only 1 of 34 runs was unsuccessful. These results indicate that the use of aerodynamic 
moments acting on the vehicle is a satisfactory method for  orientation for  the low-altitude 
aborts. This method, however, may not be operationally satisfactory. The very nature 
of the technique requires that the dynamic pressure be at a sufficiently high level to  drive 
the vehicle and therefore loss  of vehicle control power will  occur quickly. In the three 
unsuccessful runs, the pilots realized that they were at an apex-forward attitude, but 
they did not have sufficient control to maneuver the vehicle to a heat-shield-forward 
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attitude. Many of the successful runs required a "rocking" of the vehicle to perform the 
pitchup maneuver and 1 to  2 seconds delay in decision making could have caused many 
more unsuccessful runs. 
Failures in the reaction control system were not investigated for the scene with no 
recognizable landmarks. It w a s  apparent that loss of ra te  damping during the tracking 
phase would have precluded the possibility of determining track direction. 
Saturn V 
Saturn V 
Saturn V 
Saturn IB 
Saturn IB 
Saturn IB 
Saturn IB 
Saturn IB 
Saturn IB 
Failure Analysis 
The results of the reaction- control - sy stem-f ailure investigation are presented in 
tables VII and VIII. 
tinuous f u l l  thrust in the failed axis; thus this type of failure was the most critical, 
The switching-amplifier-closed or gyro-closed failures caused con- 
Dual 
Dual 
Dual 
Single 
Single 
Single 
Dual 
Dual 
Dual 
~ 
TABLE VII.- FAILURE ANALYSIS FOR CLEAR VIEW O F  FLORIDA 
= 120 000 f t  (36 576 m)] 
21.5 
29.1 
26.9 
Axis 
* 
8 
cp 
9 
8 
cp * 
e 
cp 
9.8 
13.2 
12.2 
~ 
Number 
of runs 
22.4 
24.3 
28.8 
3 
5 
5 
9 
6 
8 
23 
22 
31 
10 
7 
10 
7 
7 
8 
9 
7 
8 
10.2 
11.0 
13.1 
runs 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
2 
4 
7 
2 
3 
1 
1 
2 
1 
4 
2 
2 
Saturn IB 
Saturn IB 
Saturn IB 
I I lbm I kg I  
Single 
Single 
Single 
Switching amplifier ( 
88.5 
82.4 
83.0 
87.4 
63.4 
70.4 
82.0 
74.3 
82.3 
64.6 
29.6 
54.0 
28.6 
19.4 
21.7 
54.0 
27.8 
35.0 
en 
29.3 
13.4 
24.5 
13.0 
8.8 
9.8 
24.5 
12.6 
15.9 
~ 
Switching amplifier closed 
69.5 
81.3 
76.0 
Rate gyrc 
69.3 
76.3 
76.1 
Rate gyro closed 
69.6 
73.7 
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I 
especially if the pilot was looking at  the sky and had no visual reference when the failure 
occurred. The failure could be detected only by observing the rate  indicator, and the 
pilot's attention w a s  directed not at the instrument but toward the out-the-window view 
during this search phase. Therefore, this type of failure was not readily detected and, 
when detected, required the pilot to stabilize the vehicle again and then to resume the 
orientation maneuver. The loss of valuable time often meant that the pilot was unable 
to orient the vehicle in the proper direction. 
TABLE wI.- FAILURE ANALYSIS FOR 90-PERCENT-CLOUD-COVER 
SCENE WITH VAPOR TRAIL 
[h = 120 000 f t  (36 576 m j  
Axis Number Ier of runs unsuccessful Of Launch time, Av rage sec  1 l::?LI 1 vehicle 
- * 
e 
cp * 
e 
cp __ 
58.0 28.6 
78.8 58.0 
73.2 46.9 
68.8 14.8 
99.5 29.4 
67.5 14.3 
I 
13.0 Saturn V 
26.3 Saturn V 
21.3 Saturn V 
6.7 Saturn IB 
13.3 Saturn IB 
6.5 Saturn IB 
e 4 I cp 2 
I cp 5 e 8 
Saturn V 
Saturn V 
Saturn V 
Saturn IB 
Saturn IB 
Saturn IB 
* 
e 
cp * 
6 
40 
Dual 
Dual 
Dual 
Single 
Single 
Single 
-. 
3 
4 
4 
5 
4 
6 
72.7 41.0 
75.1 45.5 
48.0 19.7 
63.3 17.4 
73.5 20.1 
79.1 23.4 
runs 
18.6 
20.6 
8.9 
7.9 
9.1 
10.6 
3 
2 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
0 
0 
1 
1 
3 
2 
33.3 
53.7 
27.7 
22.4 
21.3 
22.8 
15.1 
24.4 
12.6 
10.2 
9.7 
10.3 
45.4 
33.8 
39.7 
27.3 
19.0 
30.9 
58.5 
77.1 
57.1 
80.3 
72.3 
80.4 
Rate gyr 
72.2 
62.3 
63.3 
83.4 
65.6 
87.7 
20.6 
15.3 
18.0 
12.4 
8.6 
14.0 
Contro 
system 
Dual 
Dual 
Dual 
Single 
Single 
Single 
Saturn V 
Saturn V 
Saturn V 
Saturn IB 
Saturn IB 
Saturn IB 
Saturn V 
Saturn V 
Saturn V 
Saturn IB 
Saturn IB 
Saturn IB 
Dual 
Dual 
Dual 
Single 
Single 
Single 
Dual 
Dual 
Dual 
Single 
Single 
Single 
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Fuel Usage  
The available fuel for  the abort maneuver is 185 pounds (84 kg) for dual-control- 
system operation and 72.5 pounds (33 kg) for  single-control-system operation. The 
average amount of fuel used and the standard deviation are given fo r  each condition in 
tables IV to  VI. The maximum amount used for  dual-control-system operation w a s  
84 pounds (38 kg). The single-control-system operation maximum amount was 67 pounds 
(30 kg) for one run; the next highest amount used was 50 pounds (23 kg). These maximum 
fuel consumptions and those listed in tables IV to VI do not include the fuel required to 
stop the tumbling prior to  the orientation maneuver. In order  to compare the total 
amount of fuel used with the available amount of fuel, the fuel required to a r r e s t  the tum- 
ble ra tes  must be added to  the amounts given. The average amount of fuel used to arrest 
the tumbling at 1000 per  second is given in table III. 
It should be noted that the study w a s  a single-pilot simulation. In the actual flight, 
the right-hand pilot could aid greatly in the search and orientation task. Possible pilot 
disorientation or  blackout caused by the high tumbling rates  encountered prior to tower 
jettison was not accounted for  in the simulation. The possible use of the sun position 
as an orientation aid w a s  not investigated. The amount of detail and contrast level of 
the clear scene of Florida used in the simulation w a s  not confirmed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A fixed-base simulation study has been conducted to determine whether a pilot 
could manually orient the Apollo vehicle to the proper reentry attitude following a high- 
altitude (120 000-foot (36 576-m) and above) abort from earth launch by using only the 
"out-the-window" visual scene as an attitude reference. The results indicate the fol- 
lowing conc lus ions : 
1. If a visual yaw reference is available, such as a landmark o r  a vapor trail ,  
manual orientation is possible for  all aborts above a 120 000-foot altitude except the 
single-control-system Saturn V 120 000-foot (36 576-m) abort. 
2. Heading determination by using ground tracking, which requires a broken cloud 
cover along the orbital track, appears feasible for  aborts above a 150 000-foot (45 720-m) 
altitude. This technique is not usable for  120 000-foot (36 576-m) aborts because of 
insufficient control time for  accurate ground tracking. The vulnerable spacecraft atti- 
tude required to perform the tracking task should be considered prior to adoption of this 
technique. 
3. Knowledge of the reaction of the vehicle to aerodynamic forces  can be a useful 
aid in determining proper vehicle orientation. However, reliance on only this knowledge 
for an operational orientation is not recommended. 
29 
4. Control-system failures which occur during the visually controlled abort 
maneuver greatly affect the pilot's ability to orient the vehicle to  the heat-shield-forward 
attitude . 
5. The amount of fuel available is sufficient for  stabilization and orientation. 
6. An unpressurized pressure suit does not affect the pilot's ability to perform 
the orientation maneuvers, 
7. No operation method has been developed fo r  the pilot using the out-the-window 
view to control the vehicle for  the 120 000-foot (36 576-m) altitude abort f rom the 
Saturn V vehicle if only the single-control system is operational. 
Langley Research Center, 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Langley Station, Hampton, Va., February 10, 1966. 
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EQUATIONS 
The Apollo abort study was a three-degree-of -rotation simulation in which only 
angular ra tes  and positions of the vehicle were involved. However, the angular motion 
of the visually displayed land mass,  as would be seen by an astronaut traveling down 
range, was programed into the simulation. Thus all motions except the lateral and 
vertical motions in the visual display were included in the simulation. During an abort, 
lateral  motions would be small. The vertical motion, which would create either a 
growth (descending altitude) o r  dwarfing (ascending altitude) of the objects in the display 
was assumed to  be negligible. 
If s = h52, h being altitude and 52 being an angle in radians about the local 
vertical, the tangential orbital velocity V is given as: 
V = = h h  + 52L 
If h = 0, as assumed in the study, 
The orientation of the spacecraft in the body-axis system (XB, YB, ZB) can be 
expressed in t e rms  of the inertial axis system (Xi, Yi, Zi) by means of the following 
orthogonal-transformation matrix of quaternion numbers (ref. 2) : 
k2 - b2 - c2 + d2 2(ab + cd) 2(bd - ac) 
a2 - b2 + c2 - d2 2(bc - ad) 
2(bc - ad) a2 + b2 - c2 - 
o r  
In te rms  of the gimbal drive system, which had an order of rotation of yaw, pitch, 
and roll, the above matrix is identically equal to the matirx 
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COS q COS e cos 8 sin IC/ 1 -sin 8 
8 sin cp cos IC/ - sin t+b cos cp cos t,b cos cp + sin e sin q9 sin cp sin cp cos e 
8 cos  cp cos q + sin tF/ sin cp sin 8 sin I& cos cp - cos q sin cp cos e cos cp 1 
The rate equations which correspond to these matrices are given as (ref. 2) 
26 = -dp - cq - br 
2b = -cp + dq + ar 
2& = bp + aq - dr 
2d = ap - bq + c r  
where p, q, and r a r e  the angular velocities about the vehicle body axis and 
(3) 
8 = q cos cp - r sin cp (4) 
A requirement in the study was that rotation about each axis be unrestricted. This 
stipulation was  accomplished by combining portions of equations (1) to (4) with the value 
of cos 8 obtained from integration: 
cos e = - 6  sin e dt s 
The method was as follows: The four quaternion rate equations (eq. (3)) were 
integrated to obtain the values of a, b, c, and d. Some of the elements of matrix (2) 
were formulated by using the following t e rms  from matrix (1): 
e l l  = a2 - b2 - c2 + d2 = cos Q cos e 
e12 = 2(ab + cd) = sin IC, cos 8 1 
e33 = a2 + b2 - c2 - d2 = cos cp cos 8 
e13 = 2(bd - ac) = -sin 8 
e23 = 2(bc - ad) = sin cp cos 8 I 
The elements e l l ,  e12, e23, and e33 were then multiplied by the value of 
cos 8 obtained f rom equation (5). This multiplication is performed to give cos2 8 in 
each element so that the sign of cos 8 does not affect the sign of the element. These 
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quantities were then used as inputs to  "polar mode" resolvers in the computer. These 
resolvers solved the arctangent equations to supply the angles q, 8, and cp to  drive 
the equipment. 
1 sin 8 'e13 tan 8 = -= Ji e13 dt COS e 
The use of these equations to drive the equipment, which had no mechanical 
restrictions, allowed unlimited rotation in all three axes. 
Equations for  the vehicle rotational accelerations about the yaw, pitch, and roll 
axes (E, 6,  b), in which all cross products of inertia are retained because of the 
expected size of the spacecraft tumble ra tes  (looo per second), are as follows: 
where I is the moment of inertia (subscripts refer to axes involved), and M is the 
moment that is given as 
The parameter M,,A is the moment due to aerodynamic forces about the XB axis, and 
the parameter M,,RCS is the moment due to the vehicle reaction-control-jet forces 
about the XB axis. 
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Figure 13 shows the relationship of the velocity vector in the inertial coordinate 
system to that in the body-axis system. The corresponding aerodynamic moment equa- 
tions a r e  derived in the following paragraphs. 
vx, B 
Figure 13.- Relation between inert ia l  and body coordinate systems. 
The components of the relative velocity vector V in the inertial system are: 
Vx,i = V COS y 
Vz,i = V sin y 1 
where y is the relative flight-path angle measured in the XiZi-plane. The components 
of the vector V in the body-axis system after rotation in the yaw, pitch, and roll order 
are: 
V y , ~  = V cos ?(cos @ sin e sin cp - cos cp sin +) - V sin y cos e sin cp (114 
V,,B = V cos y(sin e cos cp cos @ + sin @ sin cp) - V sin y cos e cos cp 
v,,B = v cos y cos + cos e + v sin y sin e 
In matrix form, these components are 
34 
APPENDM 
cos y e l l  - sin y e13 
= V cos y e21 - sin y e23 
[ o s  y e 3 1  - sin y e 3 1  
The angle of attack a is the angle between the velocity vector and the XB-axis: 
The aerodynamic moments are given as: 
where S is the aerodynamic reference area;  2 is the aerodynamic reference length; 
Xcg, Ycg, and Zcg represent the center-of-gravity location with respect to  the given 
axis; Xo, Yo, and Z o  represent the aerodynamic center of force with respect to the 
given axis; and S is the dynamic pressure  acting on the vehicle. The dynamic pressure  
c was programed for  a given trajectory as a function of time f rom abort initiation. 
aerodynamic coefficients fo r  pitching moment Cm, lift CL, and drag CD are functions 
of the total angle of attack a. 
The 
The aerodynamic roll  angle ‘pA is the angle between the ZB-axis and the com- 
ponent of the vector V in the ZBYB-plane. The sine and cosine of this angle resolve 
the coefficients f rom the a-plane into the body planes: 
VY ,B - V COS y e21 - V sin y e23 sin ‘pA = 
P y , B 2  + v ~ , B 2  /( v cos y e21 - v sin y e23)2 + (V cos y e31 - v sin y e33)2 
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The Apollo vehicle has 12 attitude jets which operate in cooperative pairs. 
pairs operate to produce positive-direction rotation about the X, Y, and Z axes of 
the vehicle. 
direction rotation. Fo r  example,, jets 10 and 12  operate together to produce a positive 
roll moment, while jets 9 and 11 operate in an opposite direction to produce a negative 
roll moment. In notation form, 
Three 
The other three pairs operate in the opposite direction to produce negative- 
In a similar manner, 
Pitch jets -c){)+ 
Yaw jets -of$ 
The forces F about the XB, YB, and ZB axes produced by these jets a re  
determined from 
+ 0.23F3 + 0.73 (F5 + F6 + F7 + 
(1 5) 
Fz = F1 + 0.68 (F2 + F4) + 0.96 (Fg + F12) + 0.975F3 - 0.36 (F10 + F11) 
Fy = 0.68(F5 + F8 - F6 - F7) + 0.28 (Fg - F12) + 0.93 (F11 - "10) 
- 0.042 F5  + F6 - F7 - Fa) ( 
The constants resolve that jet force into components along the given axis. Likewise, 
the moments about XB, YB, and ZB due to the reaction control jets a r e  
My,~cs,o = -3.792F1 + 5.66 (Fa + F4) - 3.45F3 + 0.62 F g  + F12) ( 
8) 
F10 + F11) + 0.1 (F5 + F6) + 0.892 (F7 + F 
where the constants represent moment arms. 
From equations (15) and (16), the moments due to the reaction control jets about the 
XB, YB, and ZB axes are found: 
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Mx,RCS = Mx,RCS,O - Fy (ZO - zcg) -F Fz (yo - ycg) 
MyJRCS = My,RCS,O + Fx(Z0 - zcg) - Fz(X0 - xcg) 
Mz,RCS = MzJRCS,O - Fz(yO - ycg) +- F y b O  - xcg) 1 
The mass  of the fuel used was given by the following integration: 
where 
W weight of fuel 
Isp specific impulse 
Ft total absolute force of all jets 
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